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Abstract
This article raises questions related to the rights connected with European citizenship. Fur-
thermore, it gives rise to the discussion of the basis of European citizenship. Finally, it questions
the value of European citizenship to the benefit of raising popular support of European integration.
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The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been
remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation
for intricate and delicate questions.
-James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. XLII
INTRODUCTION
Descriptions of European Union ("EU" or "Union") citizen-
ship, as introduced by the Treaty on European Union' in 1992,
usually present its importance as largely symbolic. It is true that
the first European Commission (or "Commission") proposals on
the subject as well as the original proposal put forward by the
Spanish Prime Minister at the time, Mr. Gonzdlez, were meant to
"encourage a feeling of involvement in European integration. "2
Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the European Community'
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1. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA]). The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") was amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These amendments were incorporated into the
TEU, and the articles of the TEU were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the
Treaty on European Union, OJ. C 340/2 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consoli-
dated TEU], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra,
2. RicHARD CORBETr, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT. FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICA-
TION: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 232 (1993).
3. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
TEU, supra note 1. The TEU amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community ("EEC Treaty"), as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity ("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, OJ. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty],
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("EC Treaty") defines Union citizenship as complementary:
"Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be
a citizen of the Union."4 Besides, its second paragraph links EU
citizens' rights and obligations specifically to those already ex-
isting: "Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by
this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby."'
Small wonder the concept is seen as symbolic and limited to
what already exists in the field of rights accorded to nationals of
other EU Member States.
Six years after the introduction of the notion, the European
Court of Justice (or "ECJ") had an opportunity to rule on its
supposedly symbolic value. The case concerned a Spanish wo-
man living in Germany who wanted to get a child-raising allow-
ance on the basis of her European citizenship.6 The ruling
raises questions related to the rights connected with European
citizenship. Furthermore, it gives rise to the discussion of the
basis of European citizenship. Finally, it questions the value of
European citizenship to the benefit of raising popular support of
European integration.
I. BENEFIT OF RIGHTS ATTACHED TO THE STATUS OF
EU CITIZENSHIP
A textual interpretation of the provisions on citizenship cer-
tainly leads to the conclusion that Union citizenship does not
give any extra rights in addition to those already conferred by
the EC Treaty or by the measures adopted to give it effect. It
supports EC Member States' views that EU citizenship would not
change the guarantees as given to them by the three residence
directives,7 e.g., that non-economically active persons using their
free movement rights shall not become a burden upon the host
state. And yet two years ago, the ECJ ruled that a Spanish EU-
citizen could get a German child-raising allowance on the basis
incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra; Consolidated EC treaty, supra,
art. 17, O.J. C 340/3, at 186 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 82 (ex Article 8).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2691.
7. Council Directive No. 90/364, O.J. L 180/26 (1990); Council Directive No. 90/
365, O.J. L 180/28 (1990); Council Directive No. 93/96, OJ. L 317/59 (1993) [herein-
after Council Directives].
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of her EU-citizenship. 8
In order to appreciate the benefit of rights attaching to EU-
citizenship, it is necessary to make a distinction between the
rights related to free movement and the right to equal treat-
ment. This distinction is a current one in the field of free move-
ment of workers, where paragraph 3 of Article 39 of the Consoli-
dated EC Treaty' (ex Article 48) deals with migration rights and
paragraph 2 with the prohibition of discrimination based on na-
tionality. Jobseekers enjoy full benefit of their right to free
movement (limited only in time) and a very limited benefit of
their right to equal treatment (related only to access to employ-
ment, not to other benefits).,a It can be concluded from the
Sala case that these benefits operate in reverse for persons rely-
ing on their EU-citizenship. The court's recent ruling in Wij-
senbeekl a confirms that EU-citizens have a right to equal treat-
ment, but no right, at least not yet, to completely free move-
ment.
A. Right to Equal Treatment
In its ruling in the Sala case last year, the ECJ declared that
the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality applies to
all EU-citizens who lawfully reside in another Member State. As
already stated, the case concerned a Spanish citizen, Mrs. Marti-
nez Sala, who had lived in Germany for over thirty years. From
1986 onwards, she lived on social welfare. The German authori-
ties could not require her to leave Germany, because of Article
6(a) of the European Convention on Social and Medical Assist-
ance. 12 This article prohibits repatriating a national of another
Member State "on the sole ground that he is in need of assist-
ance." The German authorities were not inclined to give her a
residence permit either. Instead she received a document stat-
ing that she applied for further extension of her residence per-
8. Sala, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2691.
9. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 39, OJ. C 340/3 at 193 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 86 (ex Article 48.)
10. The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff Deriderius
Antonissen, Case C-292/89, [1991], E.C.R. 1-745, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 373.
11. Criminal Proceedings v. F.A. Wijsenbeek, Case C-378/97 (ECJ Sept. 21, 1999)
(not yet reported).
12. European Convention on Social Medical Assistance (visited on Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/14e.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
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mit. In order to receive a child-raising allowance, Mrs. Sala was
required to produce a formal residence permit, whereas German
nationals had only to show that they were residing in the coun-
try. This clearly is discrimination on grounds of nationality13
and, within the scope of application of the Treaty, forbidden by Arti-
cle 12.14 The ECJ held that the child-raising allowance was a
family benefit under Regulations 1612/6815 and 1408/7116 and
therefore fell under the material scope of the EC Treaty. 17 Mrs.
Sala tried to come within the personal scope of the EC Treaty by
relying on her former status of worker. The ECJ, however, did
not receive sufficient information of this and left it to the na-
tional court to investigate whether she could be considered a
worker within the meaning of Article 39 of the Consolidated EC
Treaty and Regulation No. 1612/68 or Regulation 1408/71. The
ECJ then considered whether her EU-citizenship could bring
her within the scope of application of the EC Treaty.
The key question of the case was whether all EU-citizens re-
siding in another EU Member State can rely on their EU-citizen-
ship or only citizens who reside there on the basis of EC law. Mrs.
Sala did not come under the general provisions on free move-
ment of persons, but she resided lawfully in Germany under in-
ternational law, that is the European Convention on Social and
Medical Assistance. This did not refrain the ECJ from ruling
that
[a]s a national of a Member State, lawfully residing in the
territory of another Member State, the appellant in the main
proceedings comes within the scope ratione personae of the
13. The court draws an analogy with the Jean Nol Royer, Case 48/75, [1976]
E.C.R. 497, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 619, where it held that a residence permit can only have
declaratory and probative force and cannot be of a constitutive nature for the purposes
of recognition of the right to residence.
14. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 12, O.J. C 340/3, at 185 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 82 (ex Article 6).
15. See Council Regulation No. 1612/68, 257 J.0. 2 (1968), o.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1968 (II), at 475 (concerning freedom of movement for workers within Community).
16. Commission Regulation No. 1408/71, O.J. L 149/2 (1971).
17. It is argued that the Eurpopean Court of Justice (or"ECJ") fails to make a dis-
tinction between lex specialis and lex generalis and does not take into account the fact
that the Regulations apply only if all conditions are met. This means, according to
Sybilla Fries and Jo Shaw, that the child-raising allowance falls within the material scope
of the EC Treaty only if the case comes under the free movement of worker provisions.
Sybilla Fries &Jo Shaw, Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the European Court ofJustice, 4
EUR. PUB. L. 533, 543 (1998).
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provisions of the Treaty on European citizenship.' 8
Equal treatment is accorded on the basis of EU-citizenship; citi-
zens of Member States keep the status of citizenship at all times,
no matter where they are within the Union and regardless of
legal basis.19
The Sala ruling fits perfectly in case law on the prohibition
of discrimination, which has been interpreted broadly and pro-
gressively. As Advocate-General La Pergola in the Sala case
pointed out, the prohibition on discrimination has been
"recognised as a corollary of the freedom of movement."20 Thus,
his vision of the prohibition to discriminate "embraces the do-
main of the new legal status of common citizenship."21
B. Right to Free Movement
Mrs. Martinez Sala was lawfully residing in Germany, and
thus there was no need for the ECJ to rule on whether a new
right of residence could be derived from Article 17 of the Con-
solidated EC Treaty. Yet the possible right of residence deriving
from EU-citizenship got much attention in the early years of its
existence. Member States certainly would not want citizenship
to imply "benefits tourism:" citizens going around the EU look-
ing for the most beneficial social security system.
The right to move freely was not addressed by the ECJ in its
ruling, but the Commission wanted it to be the basis on which to
solve the case. According to the Commission, whose suggestions
were described in the opinion of the Advocate-General, 22 "the
right to move and reside freely throughout the Union flows di-
rectly from the Treaty. The limitations and conditions provided
for in Article 8a [at present Article 17 Consolidated EC Treaty]
therefore relate solely to the exercise of that right, established by
primary law as a freedom of the citizen." In the Commission's
18. Id. at 544.
19. In their commentary on this case, Sybilla Fries andJo Shaw conclude on the
basis of a series of U.K cases that "there is little if anything the Member States can do in
relation to their immigration sovereignty once Community nationals have lawfully
taken up residence." Fries & Shaw, supra note 17, at 547-49.
20. Sala, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2705, 23; see Cowan v. Trtsor Public, Case 186/87
[1989] E.C.R. 195, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 613 (entitling tourist, as recipient of services,
award of compensation for assault under national law.)
21. See Sala, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2701, 23. This is an argument against the vision of
Fries and Shaw. Fries & Shaw, supra note 17, at 540.
22. Sala, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2705, 59.
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view, citizens are free to move to another EU Member State, and
entitled to equal treatment, unless the host State makes use of its
limited power to restrict free movement.
1. Justification of Limitations on Free Movement Rights
More than a year after its ruling in the Sala case, the ECJ
ruled on the entitlement to free movement rights in a case that
was more or less arranged by a Dutch member of the European
Parliament, Floris Wijsenbeek.23 Returning from a European
Parliament meeting in Strasbourg, Wijsenbeek refused to show
his identity papers, as was required by national law, to the na-
tional authorities at Rotterdam airport. According to Wij-
senbeek, controls at the border are contrary to the provisions on
both the internal market as well as on citizenship (at present
Articles 14 and 17 of the Consolidated EC Treaty). The Advo-
cate-General in this case, Cosmas, took the opportunity to inter-
pret systematically the contents and legal consequences of the
provisions of Articles 14 and 17 of the Consolidated EC Treaty,
and of free movement of persons in general.
Starting with an analysis of the "classic" EC free movement
provisions (workers and self-employed), Cosmas concluded that
border controls are justified limitations, because these provisions
serve to establish a person's nationality and thereby his entitle-
ment to free movement. He then continued with an investiga-
tion of the "new" provisions, the ones concerning the internal
market and citizenship, in order to establish if they modify the
justifiability of border checks. In relation to the internal market,
he pointed to the necessity of accompanying measures before
free movement within the Community can be completed; meas-
ures are needed to check external borders, to cooperate in the
field of visas and asylum, etc. Regarding EU-citizenship, Cosmas
indicated that it gives a fundamental personal right to citizens of
the Union, which is different from the "classic" free movement
rights.24 Article 17 of the Consolidated EC Treaty gives EU citi-
zens the right to move and reside freely within the Community.
The exercise of these rights can be limited, however, as long as
such limitations are justified and do not affect the core of the
citizenship rights. In this view, border controls are no longer
23. F.A. Wijsenbeek, supra note 11.
24. Id. 95.
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generally accepted and automatically justified, but their compati-
bility with Community law needs to be accounted. This supposes
the proportionality test; border checks must be mandatory, ap-
plied without distinction, and they must be necessary and pro-
portional in order to be admitted under Community law. A lack
of Community arrangements thus may limit free movement of
persons.
Cosmas proposed an even stricter interpretation of possible
limitations of free movement. He wanted the national judge to
take into consideration non-Community legislation as well. Bor-
der controls will not be compatible with Community law if inter-
national measures exist that harmonize external border checks,
such as measures based on the Schengen Agreements. 25 This
means that it is no longer only Community law that determines
the limitations on free movement of citizens. This vision
matches the ECJ's ruling in the Sala case, where the exercise of
citizenship rights was also made possible on the basis of (non-
Community) international law.
The ECJ does not completely follow the suggested interpre-
tation of the Advocate-General. It links possible limitations on
the exercise of free movement rights with the existence of Com-
munity provisions:
However... as long as Community provisions on controls at
the external borders of the Community, which also imply
common or harmonised rules on, in particular, conditions of
access, visas and asylum, have not been adopted, the exercise
of those rights presupposes that the person concerned is able
to establish that he or she has the nationality of a Member
State. 26
2. Justification of Limitations to the Right of Residence
Border checks may limit the right to move freely, obliga-
tions to be able to provide means of subsistence may limit the
right to reside in another EU-Member State. In Community law,
the right to reside elsewhere has always been bound to the con-
dition that one is not going to be a burden on the public fi-
nances of the host state. In the traditional free movement cate-
25. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis
into the framework of the European Union, O.J. C 340/1, at 93-96 (1997).
26. Id. 42.
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gories, workers and self-employed, the economic activity is some
sort of guarantee for the host state.2 7 In the more recently cre-
ated free movement rights by secondary legislation of 1990 and
1993,28 conditions for the exercise of those rights are formulated
in such a manner that a national from another Member State
can not rely on public support from the host Member State:
those who wish to rely on the directives must have full sickness
insurance and sufficient resources.
Does citizenship bring changes to these financial condi-
tions? The Sala case adds nothing on this point. As we have
seen, the ECJ did not have to answer the question whether citi-
zenship creates a new right to residence. The question is inter-
esting for it clarifies the nature of the EU-citizenship status.
Even though the practical outcome will most probably still be
that for the time being only non-economically active EU nation-
als with sufficient resources to maintain themselves can exercise
their right to reside elsewhere in the Union. If Member States
have an absolute right to ask for financial guarantees, then EU-
citizenship is clearly limited in its nature. If this right is not abso-
lute, and on the contrary a justification from the Member States
is demanded, then EU-citizenship establishes a universal right of
residence. 29 Only then will citizenship truly be a "fundamental
legal status guaranteed to the citizen of every Member State by
the legal order of the Community and now of the Union." 0
In April 1997,31 more than a year before the Sala ruling, the
Court of First Instance ("CFI") seemed to suggest that free move-
ment and residence rights based on citizenship do not affect the
financial conditions as given by secondary legislation. The case
concerned an ex-spouse of a retired European Parliament offi-
cial, Mrs. Kuchlenz-Winter, who wanted to return to her home
country Germany, but was refrained from doing so by fear of
losing her sickness cover in Luxembourg, which was dependent
on her residence there. She had no cover under the German
27. See Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 139/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1741,
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 764 (stating that guarantees are not absolute).
28. See Council Directives, supra note 7 (explaining directives on retired persons
(90/365), those of independent means (90/364), and students (93/96)).
29. Cf Fries & Shaw, supra note 17, at 545-46 (referring to early ECJ case law on
citizenship provisions and showing that ECJ is rather reluctant in its interpretation).
30. Sala, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2700, 18.
31. Hedwig Kuchlenz-Winter v. Commission, Case T-66/95, [1997] E.C.R. 11-637.
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social security system, since she did not complete the requisite
periods of insurance in Germany. Private health insurance
schemes would refuse her, because she was suffering from a seri-
ous illness. One of the arguments she used to get sickness insur-
ance in Germany was based on Article 8A of the EC Treaty (Arti-
cle 18 of the Consolidated EC Treaty) ,32 which gives Union citi-
zens the right to reside freely within the Union 'subject to the
limitations and conditions' laid down in the EC Treaty and in
secondary legislation. Mrs. Kuchlenz-Winter reasoned that the
inability to get health insurance in Germany limited her right to
free movement as given by Article 8A of the EC Treaty (Article
17 Consolidated EC Treaty). Interestingly enough, the Commis-
sion in this case follows an opposite reasoning from the sugges-
tions it gave a year later in the Sala case. There is no mention
whatsoever of rights flowing directly from the EC Treaty. In-
stead the Commission points to the 1990/1993 free movement
directives for showing that persons without an occupation can
only rely on those directives to exercise their right of residence.
The directives make the right of residence subject to the condi-
tion that the person concerned is covered by sickness insurance
in the host State.3 3 The CFI acts upon the Commission's sugges-
tions and leaves aside any claims to a limitation of free move-
ment rights.
Would the practical outcome of the case have been differ-
ent if the ECJ's reasoning in the Sala case had been followed all
the way? It is difficult to say. The view that citizenship rights are
absolute implies that limitations have to be justified by the Mem-
ber States. A likely justification here would have been the need
to preserve the financial balance of the social security system.34
It might have been interesting to see what the ECJ would have
done: honor that justification or reject it because this single case
does not have sufficient effect on the financing or balance of the
social security system. 5
32. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 18, OJ. C 340/3, at 186 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 82 (ex Article 8a).
33. Id. 47.
34. See Hanns-Martin Bachmann v. Belgium, Case C-204/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-249,
[1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 785 (presenting justification by Belgium to limit tax deductions of
sickness insurance premiums paid abroad.)
35. See Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des employ~s privs, Case C-120/95,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-831, 40 [1998] C.M.L.R. 879.
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Until now, Member States invoke traditional case law, such
as Centre public d'aide sociale de Courcelles v. Lebon,3 6 in order to
limit access to welfare rights and act on the balance of the sys-
tem.37 According to case law, nationals of the Member States
who move to another Member State in search of work are pre-
cluded from equal treatment in the field of social and tax advan-
tages. This argument was also raised by the United Kingdom in
a case where a British national, Mr. Robin Swaddling, returned
to the United Kingdom after having worked in France. 38 He ap-
plied for income support, but which was refused to him because
he was not "habitually resident." U.K. legislation requires mi-
grant workers who return to their own State to have resided an
appreciable period in the territory of the United Kingdom in
order to receive income support. Mr. Swaddling argued that this
was contrary to Article 48 of the EC Treaty (Article 39 Consoli-
dated EC Treaty)," for it placed him in a more unfavorable posi-
tion than British nationals who did not use their right to free
movement. As Sybilla Fries & Jo Shaw point OUt, 4 ° the case
seemed to present a confrontation between traditional case law,
which permits Member States to refuse non workers the access
to welfare rights and the "new" citizenship case-law, which for-
bids Member States to discriminate against EU citizens lawfully
residing in their territory. The ECJ, however, found a solution
in the applicability of Regulation 1408/71.
In conclusion of this section it can be stated that EU-citizen-
ship has welfare implications. Though up till now there is not a
"hard case" to show that Member States have to justify denial of
income support to EU-citizens who do not fall under "classic"
free movement categories, it has been shown that there is a ten-
dency in that direction. A (negative) implication might be that
Member States will apply more strictly their right to remove per-
36. Centre public d'aide sociale de Courcelles v. Lebon Case 316/85, [1987]
E.C.R. 2811, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 337.
37. See Raymond Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-1931, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 928 (presenting justification by Belgium to limit tax
deductions of sickness insurance premium paid abroad).
38. See Robin Swaddling v. Adjudication Officer, Case C-90/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-
1075, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 679.
39. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 39, O.J. C 340/3, at 193 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 86 (ex Article 48).
40. Fries, supra note 17, at 551.
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sons whose residence rights under Community law have ended.4 1
II. THE BASIS FOR EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP
European citizenship is additional and complementary to
national citizenship. Two citizenships coexist, the national citi-
zenship is the primary and original status, the European one is
secondary. It has been said that the importance of the citizen-
ship provisions "lies not in their content, but rather in the prom-
ise they hold out for the future. '42 The relationship between two
citizenships as formulated in the European Union can be found
in the beginning of the respective federative processes in the
United States and in Switzerland. As the central power was con-
solidated over that of the Member States, local citizenship be-
came the secondary one and faded more into the background.4"
Is this the promise for the future of EU-citizenship? Before
European citizenship can grow into an original and autonomous
status, two prior conditions have to be fulfilled. First of all,
Member States have to give all EU-citizens the same legal treat-
ment when they are in their territory and in the second place the
accordance of EU-citizenship should be set by a central authority
(such as the Council). A comparison between the benefit of
rights for migrant workers in the European Community and the
one in the United States has been made by Bryant G. Garth, and
some of the cases he describes are also very interesting in the
light of possible future implications of EU-citizenship.44
Within the European Union, same legal treatment is limited
to EU-citizens lawfully residing in another Member State. The sol-
idarity that exists between citizens of one State is not present in
EU-citizenship. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, found such
41. See id. at 547-48 (showing that at present, national authorities are reluctant to
expel persons who are not or who are no longer entitled to rely upon Community
residence rights because of costs involved.)
42. David O'Keeffe, Union Citizenship, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT T-RTY
87, 106 (David O'Keefe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994).
43. Vicenzo Lippolis, European Citizenship: What It Is and What It Could Be, in EURO-
PEAN CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 317, 318-19 (Massimo La Torre ed.,
1998).
44. BRYANT G. GARTH, MIGRANT WORKERS AND RIGHTS OF MOBILITY IN THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF LAw, COMMUNITY AND CITIZEN-
SHIP IN THE WELFARE STATE, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw, EUROPE, AND THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 85-163 (Cappelletti ed., 1986). U.S. case law given in the present
contribution is taken from his comparison.
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solidarity an element of the United States and ruled accordingly.
In Edwards v. California,45 the Court overruled a Californian stat-
ute that permitted the arrest of a person who tried to bring his
brother-in-law from Texas into California. California argued
that other states should not be able to get rid of their poor and
drive them into California, which had higher welfare allowances.
It wanted to limit access to its public finances. Where EU Mem-
ber States remain largely sovereign on welfare issues and the ECJ
is reluctant to affect their sovereignty (the Sala ruling presents a
very tentative step in that direction), the Supreme Court in 1941
had no problem to find limits on state power:
[T]he peoples of the several States must sink or swim to-
gether, and.., in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division.46
As Garth points out, the Supreme Court's opinion largely
followed from the recognition of the duty to share the burden,
not only by state governments, but also by the Federal Govern-
ment as well. In 1969, in Shapiro v. Thompson,47 the Supreme
Court confirmed that no state could limit welfare benefits to per-
sons who had resided for at least one year in that state. The
Supreme Court however linked equal treatment in respect of
welfare benefits to a fundamental right to travel. No state could
come up with sufficiently compelling interests that could justify
burdening the right to travel by limiting access to welfare provi-
sions. U.S. citizens thus have a fundamental right to travel freely
and can move in order to seek higher welfare benefits. A federal
social security system surely helps to overcome the reluctance
that Member States of the Union have to free movement and to
equal treatment regarding social security. If the number of EU-
citizens residing lawfully in another Member State and applying
for social benefits is high, then it might be a reason for the Mem-
ber States to put harmonization of social security schemes on the
agenda. But the absence of a harmonized social security system
in the Union is not the only reason that the benefit of rights
attaching to EU-citizenship is less than that attaching to U.S. citi-
zenship. A second, and probably even more fundamental, rea-
son is the lack of a central authority that grants EU-citizenship.
45. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
46. Id. at 174.
47. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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European citizenship is a derived status. Requirements are
the same as those for national citizenship. Therefore it is the
competence of the individual Member States to determine who
their full citizens are. The implication is that a Member State
has no influence whatsoever on other Member States' discretion-
ary power to grant national citizenship and thereby EU-citizen-
ship. Thus, the host Member State has no way of controlling the
influx of immigrants from other EU Member States, even the EU
as a community has no control over the identification of those
entitled to European citizenship. Therefore it does not come as
a surprise that national authorities keep to financial conditions
on permitting residence to EU-citizens as long as Member State
nationality remains the basis for EU-citizenship.
It has been suggested to base European citizenship on resi-
dence in a Member State, and no longer on nationality.48
Within the Union, each Member State has its own criteria for
access to its nationality. These criteria are determined by histori-
cal, demographic, and political elements. Access to Union citi-
zenship through the naturalization process of one Member State
might be easier than through that of another. The resulting ine-
quality in obtaining Union citizenship could be an argument in
favor of residence as a basis for European citizenship. Harmoni-
zation of nationality laws could also bring the inequality to an
end, but is unrealistic because of Member States' reluctancy to
give up their prerogatives in this field.
Marie-Jos6 Garot studied the feasibility-for the rights to
vote attached to European citizenship-of basing European citi-
zenship on residence instead of on nationality.49 As she points
out, citizenship and nationality would become two distinguished
statuses. In order to formulate a concept of "Community resi-
dence" upon which Union citizenship may be founded, she
turns to several texts of secondary law, such as a 1993 Commis-
sion Recommendation regarding 'the taxation of certain items
of income received by non-residents in a Member State other
48. See, e.g., Alvaro Castro Oliveira, The Position of Resident Third-Country Nationals:
Is it too Early To Grant Them Union Citizenship?, in EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITU-
TIONAL CHALLENGE 185 (Massimo La Torre ed., 1998); Rut Rubio Marin, Equal Citizen-
ship and the Difference that Residence Makes, in EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE 201 (Massimo La Torre ed., 1998).
49. Marie-Jos6 Garot, A New Basis For European Citizenship: Residence, in EUROPEAN
CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 229 (Massimo La Torre ed., 1998).
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than that in which they are resident'5 ° and to ECJ case-law.51
She concludes that a Community notion of residence exists,
"which notion is defined in very broad terms as 'the permanent
centre of interests."' 52
European citizenship based on residence can easily be ap-
plied to the rights to vote attached to citizenship, but can it also
be applied to the right to move freely and to the right to equal
treatment in the social field? One of the arguments against free
movement without internal border checks was the lack of com-
pensating measures at the external border. If internal free
movement attached to citizenship is based on EU-residence in-
stead of on nationality, then it might be easier to attain the aboli-
tion of internal border controls. There will be no more need to
check a person's nationality, once that person is within the EU
territory. Compensating measures at the external border com-
prise the harmonization of visa and asylum policy, which the
Treaty of Amsterdam made into a matter of Community compe-
tence. 55 Though still very difficult, harmonization in this field is
more realistic than harmonization of nationality legislation.
An argument against free movement without financial guar-
antees was the lack of harmonization of social security systems
and the wish to avoid "benefits tourism." In this field, a change
in the basis of European citizenship from nationality to resi-
dence could make Member States more "flexible" in the alloca-
tion of benefits such as family allowances or education. As
Garth 4 demonstrates, the particular vulnerability in present
Community law is the fact that Member States "must provide cer-
tain benefits to any national of another Member State." It might
lessen Member States' reluctance to give up financial guarantees
related to free movement if they have the possibility to allocate
(non work-related) social benefits to only those who intend to
reside permanently.
In their comment on the Sala ruling, Fries and Shaw see two
50. Commission Recommendation No. 94/79 EC, 0. J. L 39/22 (1994).
51. Rigsadvokaten v. Nicolai Chrisian Ryborg, Case 297/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1943,
[1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 197; Pedro Magdalena Fernandez, Case 452/93, [1994] E.C.R. 4295, De
Witt, Case 282/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1221.
52. Garot, supra note 49, at 247.
53. Annette Schrauwen, People in the Community. A Recurring Fraction, 25 LEGAL IS-
SUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 93, 110 (1998).
54. See GARTH, supra note 44, at 109-10.
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possible consequences of linking the equal treatment principle
to citizenship.55 It may lead to a 'race to the bottom' in welfare
entitlements, or by contrast, it may create more solidarity in rela-
tion to welfare 'because the right to migrate and the consequent
burdens which might then fall upon public authorities will be
regarded as a normal incident of EU citizenship, just as many
argue that the right to travel and the consequences including
those in relation to public goods that flow from that is an inci-
dent of U.S. national citizenship.'56 In my opinion, the latter
option is more likely to happen, if citizenship is based on resi-
dence and Member States are not automatically obliged to allo-
cate all social benefits to any national from another Member
State who found a job in its territory.57
III. EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP AND SUPPORT
OF INTEGRATION
SOME FINAL REMARKS
In creating European citizenship, the Treaty on European
Union made clear that Europe was gradually finding a political
dimension. A common citizenship was believed to contribute to
the creation of "an ever closer union among the peoples of Eu-
rope" (Article 1 of Consolidated TEU).58 National citizenship
expresses a political bond whereby a person becomes a member
of the national community, it is the status of those who belong to
the people of the state. 59 European citizenship by analogy is sup-
posed to express the political bond between those who belong to
the people of the European Union. With the creation of a Euro-
pean citizenship, however, some felt concerned about their na-
tional citizenship and the preservation of national identity and
55. See Fries & Shaw, supra note 17, at 558.
56. Id.
57. An example of such an "automatic" allocation that seems an excrescence of the
present free movement system is Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer
Groep, Case C-337/97, (ECJJune 8, 1999) (not yet reported), where a Belgian student,
living in Belgium and pursuing her studies in Belgium received a Dutch study grant
because her mother, also living in Belgium, worked in the Netherlands.
58. Consolidated TEU, supra note 1, art. 1, OJ. C 340/2, at 152 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
at 68 (ex Article A).
59. Lippolis, supra note 43, at 317.
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national cultural traditions.6' The complementarity of Euro-
pean citizenship had to be mentioned explicitly in a protocol in
order to meet certain concerns of the Danish population that
contributed to a negative outcome of a referendum on the
Treaty on European Union. It is a sign that European citizen-
ship in itself is not enough to create a European identity or a
sense of belonging.
European citizenship contains a non-discrimination princi-
ple, which could inspire a sense of solidarity, concern and en-
gagement. The extent of the non-discrimination principle how-
ever, is not yet clear. It is partly limited to competences of the
Community and thus functionally determined. Solidarity and
belonging find their expression mainly in political and social
rights.6 1 Nevertheless, benefits of such rights attached to Euro-
pean citizenship are also functionally determined and based on
free movement as traditional Community concept.
Political rights attached to citizenship only include electoral
rights at the level of municipal and European Parliament elec-
tions (Article 19 of the Consolidated EC Treaty). The aim of
participation in municipal elections is not political participation
of European citizens in national politics, but "integration of indi-
viduals within their community of residence."62 Though polit-
ical participation on a European level is enhanced by voting
rights for the European Parliament elections, there is no real
impact on EU policy-making due to the limited powers of the
European Parliament.
The extent of social rights attached to European citizenship
is not yet clear. In its Sala ruling, the ECJ made explicit that
European citizens lawfully residing in another Member State
have equal access to social benefits. In order to become a lawful
resident, citizens will have to rely on traditional free movement
principles and thus be either economically active or self-support-
ing. The EC Treaty remains silent on the right of people to re-
ceive social security and Member States are not inclined to share
the burden in this respect.
European citizenship is built on the principle of free eco-
60. Andrea Biondi, The Flexible Citizen: Individual Protection After the Treaty of Amster-
dam, 5 EUR. PUBLIC L. 245, 257 (1999).
61. Lippolis, supra note 43, at 321.
62. Id.
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nomic movement and is definitely not the expression of belong-
ing to a political or a social community. Over the years, engage-
ment in European integration has been a concern of the Com-
munity. Attempts to stimulate engagement for integration
always had to cope with the economic character of the integra-
tion process. From the 1963 landmark decision in van Gend &
Loos,63 where the ECJ stated that the Community constitutes a
new legal order, which imposes obligations upon and confers
rights to nationals of Member States, to the 1997 introduction of
Article 255 of the Consolidated EC Treaty64 that gives citizens
access to documents of the European Parliament, Council, and
Commission, involvement in European integration remains lim-
ited to the technical, economic enterprise that the European
Union basically is. Obligations and rights of nationals given by
the EC Treaty are economic rights; access to documents equals
access to technical documents. The only way the Union will be
able to engage its citizens is the creation of a political and social
community that goes beyond economic integration. Giving law-
fully residing citizens equal access to social benefits is only a very
minor step in that direction.
63. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62, [1963]
E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
64. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 255, O.J. C 340/3, at 282 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 130 (ex Article 191a).
